Research spotlight : Should we worry about the current account deficit? by Aaron Steelman
B
y most standards, the American economy looks pretty
strong. Gross domestic product (GDP) increased
roughly 3.5 percent in 2005, the unemployment rate fell
to about 5 percent, and inflation remained relatively tame.
Still, some worry that those good data mask a more
important truth — that the United States is becoming a
heavily indebted nation. These skeptics point to the growing
current account deficit, which measures the gap between
what Americans earn and spend abroad. For 2005, the cur-
rent account deficit was roughly 6 percent of GDP. Total net
foreign liabilities now amount to roughly 25 percent of GDP.
These figures are large by historical standards. But are they
necessarily bad? Should we worry about American’s growing
current account deficit?
In a recent paper in Foreign
Affairs, David Levey, formerly
the managing director of
Moody’s Sovereign Ratings
Service, and Stuart Brown, 
an economist at Syracuse
University, argue that
America’s foreign debt poses
little threat to the United
States. Indeed, they claim that
the current account deficit is increasing largely because of
the strength of the U.S. economy.
Let’s consider why we might be concerned about
America’s foreign debt. By definition, a large current account
deficit means that foreign investors and governments are
holding substantial dollar-denominated assets. Should a few
big holders of these assets decide that they are no longer
desirable and sell them, it’s possible that this could set off a
panic, resulting in a plummeting dollar, rising interest rates,
and a shrinking U.S. economy. The net effect could be a glob-
al recession. This scenario is similar to what happened in
Mexico and Thailand in the 1990s. But if it were to occur in
the United States, the effects would be much more signifi-
cant because the American economy is so much larger.
Levey and Brown argue that the current account deficit
can be explained in terms of three different factors: trade,
domestic savings and investment, or the composition of
global wealth. “In each case, though, the risks are far less dire
than they are made out to be,” they argue. “And in many
ways, chronic current account deficits reflect strong eco-
nomic fundamentals rather than fatal structural flaws.”
Consider a trade-based account, the central part of which
is the relative strength of the U.S. economy. “In this view, the
United States has a stubborn current account deficit because
it grows faster than its trading partners and spends a dispro-
portionate share of its growing income on imported goods
and services,” Levey and Brown write.
Under the second scenario, the current account deficit
results from the difference between total investment in the
United States and domestic savings. But Levey and Brown
argue that neither savings nor investment is well measured.
“Capital gains on equities, 401(k) plans, and home values are
excluded from measurements of personal savings; when they
are added, total U.S. domestic savings is around 20 percent of
GDP — about the same rate as in other developed coun-
tries,” they write. (Of course, if home prices decline, as many
analysts predict, this would weaken the case made by Levey
and Brown.) On the investment side, “intangible” invest-
ments, such as on-the-job
training and new-product
development, are not included
in the national account, 
even though they are large 
and growing.
The third approach focuses
on international capital move-
ments. Levey and Brown
predict that, as the U.S. econo-
my continues to grow, it will
become an increasingly attractive place for foreign 
investment from China, India, and other developing 
countries. This could generate high current account deficits,
but the reasons would hardly be cause for concern.
In a response to Levey and Brown that appeared in a
subsequent issue of Foreign Affairs, economists Brad Setser
of Oxford University and Nouriel Roubini of New York
University take a much less sanguine view. They argue that
foreign central banks — mostly in Asia — are not buying
dollar-denominated assets because of strong conditions in
the United States. Rather, they are doing so to keep the
U.S. economy afloat — but that will eventually prove too
costly and come to an end. “Celebrating the United States’
real economic strengths while ignoring the real — and
growing — economic vulnerabilities associated with
unprecedented current account deficits is dangerous,”
write Setser and Roubini.
Ultimately, it’s not clear how big of a risk the current
account deficit poses to the U.S. economy. On this issue,
there is no consensus among economists. So what should the
U.S. central bank — the Fed — do in the meantime?
Continue to focus on its core mission: maintaining price sta-
bility. If there’s a relatively sure way to induce foreign
investors to shed dollars and dollar-denominated assets, it’s
to engage in inflation. RF
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